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Abstract Sale-leaseback transactions are ubiquitous in real estate markets
in the United States with annual volume estimated to be greater
than $7 billion. However, there is no evidence concerning the
price impact of such transactional arrangements. Using a data set
of sale-leaseback transactions, this study examines the price
impact on commercial property transactions across seven
markets. The ﬁndings reveal that transactions structured as sale-
leasebacks occur at signiﬁcantly higher prices than market
transactions. In addition, after accounting for income
differentials, buyers and sellers are appropriately pricing the
transactions resulting in no undue advantage to either party, that
is, the expected price premium is accounted for in the sale-
leaseback prices.
The notion that real assets trade at the present value of the asset’s discounted cash
ﬂows is a fundamental model of commercial property markets. However, within
this framework transactional attributes can cause deviations from the
‘‘equilibrium’’ market price. This paper examines the impact of sale-leaseback
arrangements on the transaction prices of commercial properties and determines
if either buyers or sellers realize a comparative advantage or an excess return.
In a sale-leaseback transaction, the owner-occupant of a commercial property sells
the asset and retains long-term operating control through a simultaneously
executed lease. Sale-leaseback transactions have a number of potential advantages
for both the seller and the buyer. Assuming that the pre-transaction owner has a
book value below the transaction price, at least ﬁve beneﬁts accrue. First, the gain
realized on the transaction by the seller can be amortized onto the seller’s income
statement thus increasing reported earnings (Moyer and Krishman, 1995). The
earnings impact will improve the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial ratios/margins as the ﬁrm
increases the use of off-balance sheet ﬁnancing. Second, the asset is removed from
the seller’s balance sheet potentially leading to further ﬁnancial ratio improvement.
If the real property is low-yielding, the disposal of low-yielding assets may also
increase the return on assets (Martinez, 1999; Barris, 2002). Third, the seller
avoids debt restrictions associated with borrowing and effectively obtains
favorable ﬁnancing on the property. Fourth, the seller releases capital/borrowing222  Sirmans and Slade
capacity for use in core operations (Horn, 2000; Barris, 2002). Fifth, the seller
may transfer latent tax beneﬁts to the buyer due to differentials in cost basis,
remaining deprecation term, and tax rates.
The buyer also beneﬁts from the transaction. The buyer in a sale-leaseback
transaction obtains an asset occupied by a long-term tenant. Obtaining the property
and tenant simultaneously has at least three advantages. First, the search costs
associated with leasing the property are eliminated. Second, the buyer is able to
evaluate the quality of the tenant before obtaining the property. Third, given the
typical triple-net underlying lease (tenant pays all operating costs), the purchasing
ﬁrm acquires an asset with characteristics very similar to a high-quality mortgage
bond. Uncertainty associated with operating expenses and vacancies are muted
increasing the investment value of the property to the buyer. Hence, the buyer
may be acquiring an asset with superior characteristics when compared to many
non-leaseback transactions.
Given the potential sale-leaseback advantages to both parties, an examination of
the impact on transaction price and whether the transaction is ‘‘appropriately’’
priced is the purpose of this paper. Using a large data set for seven property
markets in the Southwest United States, this article empirically estimates the
impact of sale-leaseback structured transactions on commercial property prices.
The data show that sale-leaseback transactions occur at signiﬁcantly higher prices
and that the pricing structure is efﬁcient. Speciﬁcally, sale-leaseback transactions
sell for a premium of about 13% relative to comparable non-sale leaseback
properties. Further, the hypothesis that the expected SLB premium is accounted
for in the transaction price cannot be rejected. Therefore, the transactions are
efﬁciently priced and neither the buyer nor seller realizes an undue advantage.
 Literature Review
Much of the existing literature on sale-leaseback transactions is provided by
practitioners and accountants and deals primarily with transaction descriptions and
accounting/tax implications (e.g., Castle, 1987; Valachi, 1999; Horn, 2000; Fiore,
2001; and Richard, 2003) or comes from the popular press (Martinez, 1999; and
Shaw, 2002).
The academic contribution tends to focus on the issue of shareholder gains in
response to the announcement of a sale-leaseback (SLB) transaction. Lewellen,
Long, and McConnell (1976), Myers, Dill, and Bautista (1976), and Alvayay,
Rutherford, and Smith (1995) argue that the presence of income taxes may allow
equity holders of leasing ﬁrms to beneﬁt at the expense of the government. For
example, if the lessor has a higher tax rate than the lessee, the higher interest and
depreciation tax shields resulting from asset ownership by the lessor will create
tax advantages that can be shared by both parties. In this case the buyer may be
willing to pay a premium because of the net beneﬁt resulting from the tax shield.
Thus, the tax advantages associated with the lease created in the SLB could be aSale-Leaseback Transactions  223
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motivation for the transaction. In this case, there are two streams of SLB research
that are relevant. First, Kim, Lewellen, and McConnell (1978) demonstrate with
a theoretical model that SLB transactions create wealth transfers between capital
providers. Essentially, SLB transactions have the potential to erode the collateral
position of the bondholders resulting in a transfer of wealth to stockholders.
Second, Polonchek, Slovin, and Sushka (1990, 1991), Rutherford (1990), Fisher
(2004), and Elayan, Meyer, and Li (2006) empirically document positive stock
price impacts associated with sellers/leasees in SLB transactions. These positive
announcement effects are consistent with the notion of wealth gains by
stockholders. As a whole, the existing theoretical and empirical evidence supports
the idea that SLBs can have signiﬁcant return advantages for seller/lessee equity
holders either by creating wealth transfers between the providers of capital or
between transaction participants and the government. Unfortunately, examination
of stock price returns does not speak to the issue of asset price differentials since
stock price announcement effects can be attributed to many variables including
wealth transfers, tax advantages, or even signaling.
The most complete academic analysis of real estate leases is by Grenadier (2005),
who provides a uniﬁed equilibrium approach to valuing commercial real estate
leases including leases with purchase options, forward leases, gross and net leases,
and sale leasebacks. As Grenadier notes: ‘‘The (sale leaseback) transaction has
two components: setting the sales prices and setting the lease terms (Grenadier,
2005, p. 1210).’’ If the sales price for a sale leaseback differs from the ‘‘market
value,’’ then the lease rental rate must be different than the market rental rate.
This idea is examined in the following empirical section where we test for
differences in sales prices and rental rates on sale leaseback transactions, compared
to non-sale leaseback transactions.
Whereas the practitioner literature on sale-leasebacks is replete with articles that
address transactional advantages of SLBs and a signiﬁcant academic contribution
addresses equity returns, we are aware of no studies that examine explicitly
whether SLB transactions impact transaction price and whether these potential
price differentials are efﬁcient (correctly priced). This article seeks to answer these
questions.1
 Sale-Leaseback Transactions
For a SLB transaction to occur in an open market, both parties must be
advantaged. To consider the price impacts of a SLB transaction, we ﬁrst consider
the transaction decision criteria for both seller and buyer.
The Seller/Lessee
For a transaction to occur, the beneﬁts to the buyer must be greater than or equal
to the beneﬁts for the seller. First, consider the potential seller/lessee’s position.224  Sirmans and Slade
For the seller, the question of whether to enter into the SLB transaction is based
on the beneﬁt of selling compared to the beneﬁt of continued ownership. Equation
(1) presents the trade-off for the seller.
LPer LPmt *( 1 r ) ts (ATSP )    0 t (1  g ) t1 s
1
1  cb ATSP sn RDT (1  g )  * r  0, (1)  s  n d (1  g) 	 
  gs
where:
ATSP0  After-tax sale proceeds;
LPmt  Lease payment;
rs  Seller tax rate;
gs  Seller cost of capital;
LPer  Lease period;
cbs  Seller cost basis;
d  Length of straight-line depreciation for property type;
RDT  Seller remaining depreciation term;
g  Market discount rate; and
n  Holding period.
The ﬁrst term in Equation (1) (ﬁrst set of square brackets) represents the net
beneﬁts of selling the property and entering into a long-term lease. Speciﬁcally,
the seller/lessee receives the after-tax sales proceeds (ATSP) at the initiation of
the transaction and makes tax deductible lease payments for the life of the lease
contract. The second term describes the prospects of continuing to own/occupy
the property. Continued ownership will provide a depreciation tax shield over the
remaining depreciable life of the asset. The annual beneﬁt of the depreciation tax
shield is speciﬁed in the ﬁrst set of round brackets (cost basis, cb, divided by the
depreciation term, d, multiplied by the tax rate, r). The second set of round
brackets simply accounts for the present value of the annual depreciation tax shield
over the remaining depreciation term. The ﬁnal set of round brackets is the present
value of the after-tax sale proceeds associated with selling the property in the
future.
The obvious implication of the model is that the question of whether to enter the
transaction will be decided by cost and beneﬁt analysis. If the beneﬁts/cash ﬂows
associated with selling are greater than the beneﬁts/cash ﬂows from holding, then
the seller/lessee is motivated to proceed with the SLB transaction.Sale-Leaseback Transactions  225
JRER  Vol. 32  N o . 2–2 0 1 0
The Buyer/Lessor
For the buyer, the question of whether to enter the SLB transaction is based on
the beneﬁts of buying compared to the initial cash outlay, i.e., the purchase price.
LPer LPmt *( 1 r ) cb tb b  * r     t (1  g ) d  t1 b
1
1  ATSPn d (1  g )  (PP )  0, (2) b  0 n (1  g) 	
 gb
where:
LPmt  Lease payment;
rb  Buyer tax rate;
gb  Buyer cost of capital;
LPer  Lease period;
cbb  Buyer cost basis;
d  Length of straight-line depreciation for property type;
n  End of holding period;
g  Market discount rate; and
PP0  Initial purchase price.
The ﬁrst term in Equation (2) (ﬁrst set of round brackets) represents the present
value of the after-tax income obtained from the lessee. The second and third set
of round brackets combined represents the present value of the tax shield, while
the fourth set of round brackets represents the present value of the after-tax sale
proceeds associated with selling the property in the future (the reversion). In short,
the terms in the square bracket represent the total ﬁnancial beneﬁt from owning
the property. If the total beneﬁt of owning exceeds the initial purchase price (PP0),
then the buyer/lessor is motivated to proceed with the SLB transaction.
Notice that in both Equations (1) and (2) the decision criteria depend in large
measure on the transaction price, i.e., ATSP0 and PP0. Also note that for a
transaction to occur, Equations (1) and (2) must be true and ATSP0 must equal
PP0. If we assume the following equalities rs  rb, gs  gb, cbs  cbb, and RDT
 d, then Equations (1) and (2) cannot both be true. Therefore, a transaction will
only occur when one or more of the equalities are not true. In addition, a
transaction will occur only if:226  Sirmans and Slade
1 LPer 1  LPmt *( 1 r ) cb tb b d (1  g )  * r     b b t (1  g ) d 	
 t1 b gb
LPer LPmt *( 1 r ) ts    t (1  g ) t1 s
1
1  cbs RDT (1  g )  * r . (3)  s s d 	
 gs
Assuming all else is equal, the above equation is true if gb  gs,o rrb  rs,o r
cbb  cbs,o rd  RDT.2 There is no reason to believe that the cost of capital (g)
or the tax rate (r) would be systematically different across buyers and sellers of
SLB transactions to result in a consistent differential. There is, however, good
reason to believe that the cost basis for the buyer will be greater than the cost
basis of the seller (cbb  cbs) and that the remaining depreciation term will be
greater for the buyer compared with the seller (d  RDT). The cost basis in a
property is established at the time of purchase and does not change over time
unless there are capital improvements to the property. Property values have tended
to appreciate over time, therefore a buyer’s cost basis is almost always higher
than seller’s cost basis. When a property is purchased the depreciation time clock
is reset, therefore, the remaining term of depreciation for the buyer (d) will always
be greater than the remaining depreciation term for the seller (RDT). Because both
the cost basis and the remaining depreciation term decline intertemporally for the
seller, the value of the tax shield also declines. A commercial property transaction
basically transfers a latent tax shield to the buyer. This tax shield transfer can
result in the buyer bidding away a property from a seller.
The Sales Price Differential
One question in this research is whether the sales price is impacted by the
SLB nature of the transaction as compared with a simple asset sale (with no
companion lease component). If a premium exists for properties purchased as part
of an SLB, it must be the case that buyers who pay the premiums reap greater
beneﬁts from SLB transactions than from non-SLB transactions. That is, for an
SLB premium to exist, the beneﬁts from a transaction involving an SLB must be
greater than the beneﬁts from a comparable non-SLB transaction. Equation (4)
compares the beneﬁts of the SLB verses non-SLB acquisition from the buyer’s
perspective:Sale-Leaseback Transactions  227
JRER  Vol. 32  N o . 2–2 0 1 0
LPer LPmt *( 1 r ) tb , S L B   t (1  g ) t1 b,SLB
1
1  cbb,SLB d (1  g )  * r  b,SLB b,SLB d 	
 gb,SLB
LPer LPmt *( 1 r ) t b,NONSLB    t (1  g ) t1 b,NONSLB
1
1  cbb,NONSLB d (1  g )  * r . (4)  b,NONSLB b,NONSLB d 	
 gb,NONSLB
The ﬁrst term in Equation (4) (ﬁrst set of round brackets) represents the present
value of the after-tax income obtained from the lessee in the SLB transaction. The
second and third terms describe the present value depreciation beneﬁts associated
with the transaction. On the right-hand side, the income and tax beneﬁts from a
non-SLB transaction are given with similar interpretations of the variables. If this
inequality holds, then competition among buyers would be manifest in a price
premium on SLB transactions.
Please note that the transfer of tax beneﬁts can be a primary justiﬁcation of any
transaction, but because the tax beneﬁts are the same for both SLB and non-SLB
transactions, this could not account for price differentials between SLB and non-
SLB transactions. Therefore, the price premium (differential) could only be
observed if there were differences in the expected cash ﬂows (LPMT) and or the
risk (gb). In other words, one or both of the following inequalities would have to
hold:
LPMT  LPMT SLB NONSLB
g  g b,SLB b,NONSLB
Assuming market rents, the expected cash ﬂows for a SLB property could be
greater because of the lack of anticipated periodic vacancy or tenant turnover
typically observed in commercial property markets, whereas SLB properties
typically encounter no vacancy. In addition, the credit proﬁle for SLB tenants may
be higher and the history of the ﬁrm (lessee) at the property location may lead to
lower risk. The primary purpose of this research is to empirically determine if a
price premium (differential) is observed in SLB transactions and then to determine228  Sirmans and Slade
if this differential is appropriately priced. The above theory suggests it is highly
likely that a price differential will occur and the efﬁcient market hypothesis
suggests that it will be correctly priced.
 Data
To test the SLB effect on transaction prices for commercial properties, we use
data for 3,978 ofﬁce, industrial, and retail properties in seven southwest U.S. cities
from January 1993 through December 2007 provided by CoStar Group, Inc.3 The
seven markets are Los Angeles, Orange County, Riverside, San Bernardino,
San Diego, Las Vegas, and Phoenix. CoStar investigates commercial property
transactions by physically inspecting each property and conﬁrming the details of
the transaction with the relevant parties, including buyer, seller, and broker. This
includes veriﬁcation of the SLB status of the transaction.4 Exhibit 1 provides
descriptive statistics of the data for the total sample and for the SLB and non-
SLB transactions separately.
As shown in Exhibit 1, Panel A, sales prices for the total sample range from
$200,500 to $45,000,000. The physical characteristics (building area, age, land
area, and ﬂoor area ratio) of the SLB (Panel B) and non-SLB (Panel C) samples
are very similar. The building size of the SLB transactions is only slightly larger
(24,673 sq. ft. vs. 24,043 sq. ft.) than the non-SLB, building age slightly younger
(20.53 years vs. 23.72 years), almost equal land area, and ﬂoor area ratio. Exhibit
2 contains difference in means test between various characteristics of the two
samples. In general, the samples are very similar across most of the characteristics.
Comparing the SLB and non-SLB transactions does yield some interesting
differences in sales price, capitalization rate, and net operating income per square
foot. Although the minimum and maximum sales prices vary considerably, the
means at $2,460,448 (SLB) and $2,264,535 (non-SLB) are quite similar. Using
the mean data, SLB transaction prices are about 8% higher, and about 20% per
square foot higher, than non-SLB transactions. The mean capitalization rate for
the SLB properties is 52 basis points lower than non-SLB properties. In addition,
the mean NOI per square foot is $1.70 higher for SLBs versus non-SLBs. Equation
4 showed that a price premium can exist only if either LPMTSLB  LPMTNONSLB
or gb,SLB  gg,NONSLB. The empirical data show both inequalities exist, increasing
the expectation of a price premium for SLB transactions.
Exhibit 3 shows the frequency of other characteristics of the data. There are 163
SLB transactions (about 4% of the total sample). The data are distributed across
property type, with retail properties comprising 45% of the data, industrial
properties 29%, and ofﬁce properties 26%. Los Angeles dominates the sample
with 49%, while Orange County comprises 15%. Transactions in the remaining
geographic areas range from 9% to 4% of the sample. Eleven percent of the buyers
are located out-of-state, while 18% of the sellers are out-of-state. The availability
of these data allows for an explicit examination of the impact of these buyer andSale-Leaseback Transactions  229
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Exhibit 1  Descriptive Statistics for SLB and Non-SLB Transactions
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Panel A: All transactions (3,978 total observations)
Sales Price $2,272,563 $3,412,966 $200,500 $45,000,000
Price Per Square Foot $105.02 $69.94 $25.09 $496.96
Net Operating Income $206,435 $294,689 $12,169 $3,771,230
Capitalization Rate (%) 9.28 2.17 5.01 15.99
NOI Per Square Foot $9.28 $5.50 $2.01 $33.97
Building Area (Sq. Ft.) 24,069 27,417 2,004 148,784
Building Age (Years) 23.59 17.34 0.00 79.00
Land Area (Acres) 1.48 2.05 0.03 20
Floor Area Ratio 0.51 0.41 0.10 3.98
Panel B: SLB transactions (163 observations)
Sales Price $2,460,448 $2,871,485 $260,000 $16,685,000
Price Per Square Foot $126.12 $78.21 $26.00 $427.79
Net Operating Income $217,087 $260,107 $22,230 $1,582,137
Capitalization Rate (%) 8.78 1.86 5.01 13.71
NOI Per Square Foot 10.90 6.66 2.42 31.36
Building Area (Sq. Ft.) 24,673 28,542 2,512 128,670
Building Age (Years) 20.53 15.78 0.00 75.00
Land Area (Acres) 1.47 1.72 0.07 12.25
Floor Area Ratio 0.47 0.40 0.10 3.19
Panel C: Non-SLB transactions (3,815 observations)
Sales Price $2,264,535 $3,434,291 $200,500 $45,000,000
Price Per Square Foot $104.12 $69.44 $25.09 $496.96
Net Operating Income $205,979 $296,089 $12,169 $3,771,230
Capitalization Rate (%) 9.30 2.18 5.01 15.99
NOI Per Square Foot $9.21 $5.44 $2.01 $33.97
Building Area (Sq. Ft.) 24,043 27,371 2,004 148,784
Building Age (Years) 23.72 17.39 0.00 79.00
Land Area (Acres) 1.48 2.06 0.03 20.00



















Exhibit 2  t-Tests for Difference between Means for SLB and Non-SLB Commercial Property Transactions
Mean t-Stat. p-valuet
Variable Full Sample SLB Non-SLB
Difference
Between Means
Sales Price $2,272,563 $2,460,448 $2,264,535 0.72 0.4730
Price Per Square Foot $105.02 $126.12 $104.12 3.94 0.0001
Net Operating Income $206,435 $217,087 $205,979 0.47 0.6375
Capitalization Rate (%) 9.28 8.78 9.30 3.00 0.0027
NOI Per Square Foot $9.28 10.90 $9.21 3.84 0.0001
Building Area (Sq. Ft.) 24,069 24,673 24,043 0.29 0.7739
Building Age (Years) 23.59 20.53 23.72 2.30 0.0213
Land Area (Acres) 1.48 1.47 1.48 0.08 0.9383
Floor Area Ratio 0.51 0.47 0.51 1.28 0.2012
Notes: The full sample is 3,978 observations. The SLB is 163 observations. The non-SLB is 3,815 observations.Sale-Leaseback Transactions  231
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Exhibit 3  Descriptive Statistics for a Sample of Commercial Property Transactions
Explanatory Variable All Observations SLB Observations Non-SLB Observations
Total Observations 3,978 163 3,815
Property Type
Ofﬁce 1,046 45 1,001
Industrial 1,162 70 1,092
Retail 1,770 48 1,722
Geographic Area
Los Angeles 1,955 67 1,888
Orange Co. 604 27 577
Riverside 209 5 204
San Bernardino 272 13 259
San Diego 367 17 350
Las Vegas 226 19 207
Phoenix 345 15 330
Conditions of Sale
Sale Leaseback 163 163 0
Buyer-out-of-state 450 37 413
Seller-out-of-state 715 23 692
Time Distribution
1993 396 2 394
1994 526 5 521
1995 410 12 398
1996 527 16 511
1997 436 20 416
1998 297 17 280
1999 205 12 193
2000 196 10 186
2001 156 5 151
2002 227 12 215
2003 197 20 177
2004 160 9 151
2005 88 7 81
2006 76 11 65
2007 81 5 76
Note: The data were obtained from CoStar.
seller characteristics on the transaction prices. Regarding the transactions across
time, Exhibit 3 shows that the number of transactions in the sample decreased
during the last ﬁve years. This decline is due to the screening of the data. The
data suggests that CoStar has not been as actively gathering net operating income
or capitalization rate data during these periods. Because both of these variables232  Sirmans and Slade
were required in the initial data ﬁltering process, the number of transactions
available for study is diminished in the later years.
 Empirical Models
SLB Price Differential
In order to determine if price differentials result from SLB transactions, we
estimate a standard price equation for commercial properties. The dependent
variable, LNPRICE, is regressed on property, transaction, location, and market
condition (time) variables. The model is represented as follows:
LNPRICE     SLB   LNSQFT   AGE 01 2 3
  AGESQ   FAR   BUYEROUT 45 6
3
  SELLEROUT  PROPTYPE  7 i
i2
71 5
 GEOAREA  TIME, (5)  ii i
i2 i2
Where:
LNPRICE  Natural log of sales price;
SLB  A binary variable for the sale-leaseback status of the
transaction ( 1 if the transaction is a SLB);
LNSQFT  The natural log of the square footage of building area;
AGE  Age of building(s) in years;
AGESQ  Age squared;
FAR  Floor area ratio (building area divided by site area);
BUYEROUT  A binary variable if the buyer resides out-of-state ( 1i f
present); and
SELLEROUT  A binary variable if the seller resides out-of-state ( 1i f
present).
PROPTYPE  Property type; property types include ofﬁce, industrial, and
retail. Each property type is included in the structural model as
a binary variable, except ofﬁce, which is suppressed.
GEOAREA  Geographic location of each transaction; geographic areas
include Los Angeles, Orange County, Riverside, San
Bernardino, San Diego, Las Vegas, and Phoenix. Each
geographic area is included in the structural model as a binary
variable, except Phoenix, which is suppressed.Sale-Leaseback Transactions  233
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MKTCON  Market conditions proxied by annual time dummies from 1993
through 2007. Each annual time period is included in the
structural model as a binary variable, except 1993, which is
suppressed.
The dependent variable is speciﬁed as the natural logarithm of the sales price for
two reasons. First, this form gives less weight to extremely high values (potential
outliers) than does an untransformed dependent variable (de Leeuw, 1993).
Second, the sales price is truncated at zero on the left side of the distribution, but
skewed on the right side of the distribution, similar to a lognormal distribution;
therefore, the speciﬁcation is consistent with the distribution of the sales prices in
the sample.5
The primary variable of interest is the sale-leaseback variable (SLB). The model
suggests that the parameter on SLB will be positive if the rental revenue is higher
or the discount rate is lower, compared with arms-length transactions. If SLB is
positive and signiﬁcant, then we will conclude that sale-leaseback transactions
occur at a price premium compared with arms-length transactions and we will
reject the null hypothesis that sale-leaseback transactions have no impact on the
purchase price.
The building size variable is speciﬁed as the natural log of building square feet
(LNSQFT). This speciﬁcation allows price to increase with building size, at either
an increasing or decreasing rate. Generally, price increases with building size, but
at a decreasing rate due to economies of scale in construction. This correlation,
however, does not always hold. In some cases large tenants (occupants) pay a
premium, on a per square foot basis, for space that will accommodate their
physical requirements.
The AGE of the property is expected to be negatively related to sales price.
Because properties typically depreciate at a non-linear rate over time, the AGESQ
variable is included to capture the declining rate of depreciation and capture any
vintage value that may exist with historic properties.
The ﬂoor-area-ratio (FAR), calculated by dividing the building area by the site
area, is expected to be positively related to sales price because a larger FAR ratio
typically results in vertical construction that is more costly to build and that
commands higher rents.
The dichotomous variable BUYEROUT controls for any price impact that out-of-
state buyers have on the transaction price. Lambson, McQueen, and Slade (2004)
ﬁnd that anchoring-induced bias and higher search costs can lead to out-of-state
buyers paying a price premium. Within the dataset, out-of-state buyers represent
11% of the transactions. We expect the parameter on this variable to be positive
and signiﬁcant. Because of similar information asymmetries expected when the
buyer is out-of-state, we expect the seller out-of-state (SELLEROUT) variable to
be negative.234  Sirmans and Slade
PROPTYPE speciﬁes three property types included in the dataset including
OFFICE, INDUSTRIAL, and RETAIL. The omitted category is ofﬁce properties.
We expect retail properties to sell at a premium over ofﬁce properties because
retail properties typically have superior locations and more costly tenant
improvements. However, we expect industrial properties to sell at a discount to
ofﬁce properties due to inferior locations and interior build-out.
The data used in this analysis include transactions located in seven large
metropolitan areas in the southwest area of the U.S. To control for the differences
in location that may impact price, geographic (GEOAREA) dichotomous variables
are incorporated into the model. Dichotomous annual time variables are also
incorporated into the model to capture any intertemporal price changes that have
occurred during the period under investigation. In this case we employed annual
time variables ranging from 1993 through 2007.
 Price Effect of Sale-Leaseback
Column 1 of Exhibit 4 shows the estimation results of Equation 5.
The model performs well with high R2, high F-stat, and coefﬁcients that carry a
sign that is consistent with economic theory. The coefﬁcient on SLB is positive
and signiﬁcant (t-stat  3.88). The coefﬁcient of 0.1298 can be interpreted to
mean that SLB transactions occur at about 13.86% premium to non-SLB
transactions.6 In robustness checks, this result is robust to alternative speciﬁcations
of the model and with the larger dataset from which the ﬁnal data are drawn.7
Thus, properties involved in an SLB transaction trade at a signiﬁcantly higher
price. All the other variables have the expected results: The building size effect
(natural log of square feet) is positive and signiﬁcant, indicating that the
transaction price increases with property size; building AGE (negative) and
AGESQ (positive) are both signiﬁcant, indicating that older properties transact at
lower prices but that the effect is at a declining rate.
Conﬁrming the results from Lambson, McQueen, and Slade (2004), out-of-state
buyers pay a signiﬁcant premium of about 13% (t-value  5.22). The PROPTYPE
coefﬁcients show that industrial properties transact at a signiﬁcant discount to
ofﬁce properties and retail properties transact at a premium. The location variables
(GEOAREA) also contribute to the model’s explanatory power. With Phoenix as
the suppressed area, the data indicate that San Bernardino has an inferior location
for commercial property when compared to Phoenix; however, the remaining cities
have a superior location.
The time variables also contribute to the explanatory power of the model by
controlling for the signiﬁcant temporal changes experienced in the southwest area
during the sample period. Although not shown in Exhibit 4, the coefﬁcients on
the time variables indicate that property values increased 278% during the 15-year
period of the study (1993–2007).Sale-Leaseback Transactions  235
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Exhibit 4  Effect of SLB on Commercial Property Prices
Explanatory Variable Total Sample SLB Sample Non-SLB Sample




Log of Building Area (LNSQFT) 0.8574* 0.8364* 0.8588*
(115.47) (22.48) (112.88)
Building Age (AGE) 0.0194* 0.0193* 0.0188*
(15.01) (2.94) (14.18)
Building Age Squared (AGE2) 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0002*
(10.02) (1.12) (9.49)
Floor Area Ratio (FAR) 0.0003 0.1319 0.0044
(0.02) (1.57) (0.24)
Buyer Out-of-State (BUYEROUT) 0.1264* 0.1669 0.1215*
(5.22) (1.83) (4.84)
Seller Out-of-State (SELLEROUT) 0.0360* 0.1658 0.0456*
(2.03) (1.66) (2.51)
Industrial Property (INDUST) 0.4973* 0.5994* 0.4906*
(27.01) (6.79) (25.93)
Retail Property (RETAIL) 0.0882* 0.0502 0.0905*
(5.14) (0.55) (5.17)
Los Angeles (LA) 0.3333* 0.4564* 0.3284*
(11.98) (3.46) (11.52)
Orange County (ORG) 0.3534* 0.4745* 0.3454*
(11.63) (3.22) (11.11)
Riverside (RIV) 0.0340 0.0986 0.0259
(0.90) (0.46) (0.67)
San Bernardino (SB) 0.1249* 0.0613 0.1293*
(3.51) (0.37) (3.54)
San Diego (SD) 0.2599* 0.4291* 0.2512*
(7.94) (2.83) (7.49)
Las Vegas (VEGAS) 0.1863* 0.0655 0.1958*
(5.22) (0.48) (5.29)
R2 0.8394 0.8349 0.8400
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of sales price (LNPRICE). The suppressed
dichotomous variables include OFFICE, PHOENIX,a n dYEAR 1993. The annual time variables are
not shown, but are available upon request. The full sample is 3,978 observations. The SLB is 163
observations. The non-SLB is 3,815 observations. t-values are in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.236  Sirmans and Slade
Overall, the hedonic model explains most of the variation in prices in the data
set. Columns 2 and 3 of Exhibit 4 show the regression results from the separate
analysis of the SLB and non-SLB transactions. The data indicates that the
regression results are stable across the two datasets. Thus it appears that the price
differential is driven by the SLB effect.
More importantly, the results indicate that SLB transaction occur at a signiﬁcant
price premium relative to non-SLB transactions. But, is the premium ‘‘correctly’’
priced?
 Market Efficiency
Since the SLB variable is positive and signiﬁcant, it is important to determine if
buyers and sellers are appropriately pricing the transactions so that neither party
is realizing a comparative advantage. Efﬁcient markets would lead us to believe
that both parties should account for all unique characteristics of the SLB
transaction so that there is no undue advantage for either party. Therefore, we
formulate a testable hypothesis that the expected SLB premium is accounted for
in the transaction price and that there is no separate unaccounted SLB effect.
Equation 4 showed that a price premium could occur if either LPMTSLB 
LPMTNONSLB or gb,SLB  gb,NONSLB. If either of these conditions exists, then the price
premium could be accounted for and the transaction could be efﬁciency priced.
The empirical dataset includes the net operating income (NOI) for each property;
therefore, the hypothesis is testable by regressing the transaction price on NOI
and SLB.8 This speciﬁcation accounts for both the LPMT (proxied by NOI) and
g (proxied by the implicit capitalization rate).9 Exhibit 5 summaries the results
from this analysis, estimated both in a log-linear (Panel A) and unlogged (Panel
B) form. Both models have high adjusted R-squares (.96 and .94).
Column 1 of Panel A of Exhibit 5 shows that the parameter on NOI is 0.93 with
a t-value of 291.89. With the double log speciﬁcation, this parameter is interpreted
as an elasticity, i.e., a 1% increase in NOI leads to a 0.93% increase in transaction
price. In the unlogged form (Panel B), the estimated coefﬁcient (the NOI
multiplier) is 10.9 (t-stat. of 236.92), implying a capitalization rate of 9.2%. Of
particular interest is the SLB variable, which is insigniﬁcant in both speciﬁcations.
These results suggest that there is no separate SLB effect, once we account for
income and yield.
Column 2 of both Panels A and B in Exhibit 5 goes one step further by including
an interaction term of both NOI and SLB in the model; however, the results are
virtually the same, conﬁrming the previous ﬁndings. Therefore, buyers and sellers
are correctly pricing the characteristics of the SLB arrangement.
Omitted Variables Bias
In any empirical analysis without observable determinants, the possibility of
omitted variable bias exists. For omitted variables to distort the ﬁndings on theSale-Leaseback Transactions  237
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Exhibit 5  OLS Regression Results with Net Operating Income
Explanatory Variable
Panel A: Dependent variable is the natural log of sales price (LNPRICE)
Intercept 3.0567* 3.0584*
(77.27) (76.05)
Sale Leaseback (SLB) 0.0106 0.0394
(0.65) (0.19)
Log of NOI (LNNOI) 0.9317* 0.9315*
(291.89) (286.64)
Log of NOI*SLB 0.0042
(0.25)
Adj. R-Square 0.9611 0.9611
Panel B: Dependent variable is the sales price (PRICE)
Intercept 273,652* 274,295*
(4.47) (4.47)






Adj. R-Square 0.9402 0.9402
Notes: The full sample is 3,978 observations. The suppressed dichotomous variable includes YEAR
1993 and Phoenix. The annual time variables and location variables are not shown, but are
available upon request. t-values are in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
price impact of SLB transactions, the omitted variable would have to have
explanatory power, be correlated with SLB, and not be explained by the included
set of independent variables in Equation (5). Viewing our inference structure as a
standard omitted variable test for the impact of an SLB transaction (e.g., Holmes
and Horvitz, 1994; Hunter and Walker, 1996; and Phillips-Patrick and Rossi,
1996), the potential impact of omitted variables is muted. While omission of a
hedonic variable such as story height may impact other hedonic variables, such
as parking, it is more difﬁcult to see how omission of a hedonic variable would
signiﬁcantly impact the coefﬁcient of non-hedonic variables, such as the variables
of interest, namely SLB.238  Sirmans and Slade
 Conclusion
While previous studies have documented positive stock price reaction to the
announcement of an SLB transaction, there has been no investigation of price
differentials associated with this transaction structure. Using hedonic price
estimation, the data show that SLB transactions occur at an economically and
statistically signiﬁcant price premium. The estimated equation indicates that, on
average, a SLB transaction occurs at about a 13.86% premium compared to non-
SLB transactions. The model does a nice job of explaining cross-section
differences in transaction price. High R2, high F-stats, and economically intuitive
parameter signs all indicate that the hedonic price model is well-suited to speak
to the issue of price premiums in SLB transactions.
Given the existence of price premiums documented in the data, the obvious need
arises to explain why the premiums exist. The data suggest that NOI is higher
(and thus, capitalization rates are lower) for SLB transactions compared with non-
SLB transactions. There are two possible reasons for these differentials: (1) the
expected cash ﬂows for a SLB property may be greater because of the lack of
anticipated periodic vacancy caused by tenant turnover typically observed in
commercial property markets, and (2) the credit proﬁle for SLB tenants may be
higher and the history of the ﬁrm (lessee) at the property location may lead to
lower risk. While it does appear that SLBs sell at a premium in the market relative
to other properties, there is not a premium once adjustments are made to the
comparables. That is, once income is accounted for, there is no price premium;
therefore, the market appears to be efﬁcient.
 Endnotes
1 Related literature on SLBs, price premiums, and market efﬁciency include Redman and
Tanner (1991), Attebery and Rutherford (1993), Clayton (1998), Hardin and Wolverton
(1999), and Elayan, Meyer, and Li (2006).
2 For simplicity we drop the reversion, which is identical for buyer and seller.
3 CoStar Goup, Inc. investigates and compiles real estate transaction data in many cities
in the U.S. Summaries of the transactions are provided to interested parties on a
subscription basis. We thank CoStar for their generous assistance with the data.
4 The data used in this study are a subset from a larger dataset that included approximately
69,000 transactions located in the Southwest. The working dataset was ﬁltered on
available property characteristics including building area, building age, land area, net
operating income, and direct capitalization rate. The top and bottom 1% of the data of
all variables were then eliminated to reduce the possibility of outliers.
5 Related literature on hedonic price analysis include Saderion, Smith, and Smith (1994),
Des Rosiers and Theriault (1996), Berry, McGreal, Stevenson, Young, and Webb (2003),
and Jud (2003).Sale-Leaseback Transactions  239
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6 The coefﬁcient on the SLB variable can be transformed into an indication of the
percentage of price increase by using the relationship PERCENT INCREASE 
100[e
0.12985  1] or 13.86% (Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980).
7 As one of the reviewers noted, the choice to SLB or non-SLB is potentially endogeneous
leading to possible selection bias. To examine this, we employed Heckman’s method to
test for sample selection bias. The analysis found no evidence of sample selection bias.
8 At the time a property sells, CoStar conﬁrms the details of the transaction, e.g., sales
price, with the buyer and seller and attempts to collect income and expense data on the
property. A conversation with a CoStar representative found that the ‘‘net income’’
identiﬁed in the CoStar dataset is the net income that the property was generating at the
time of sale. Although this is no doubt the case with most transactions reported in the
dataset, there is evidence that the net income for some transactions is forecast, not
historical. This is particularly the case with the SLB transactions. By deﬁnition, SLB
properties are owner-occupied prior to the sale; therefore, the net income is forecast rather
than historical.
9 Once sales price and net operating income are known, the capitalization rate is known
by deﬁnition.
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